Self-Deception: Freud versus Evolutionary Psychology, Theory of Evolutionary Literary Criticism, Part 7

In August of 2019, I posted a blog entry comparing the Freudian theory of psychological repression with the concept of competing selection pressures from evolutionary psychology, as integrated with multilevel selection theory. Freud, as interpreted by Norman O. Brown, argued that there was a life instinct that battled a death instinct. Multilevel selection theory, on the other hand, posits a competition between two forms of selection pressure: selection pressure for the individual and selection pressure for the group.

I have come across another example of a phenomenon that has a Freudian interpretation and an interpretion courtesy of evolutionary psychology: self-deception. I just finished the book, The Elephant in the Brain: Hidden Motives in Everyday Life, by Kevin Simler and Robin Hanson (Oxford UP, 2018).

Simler and Hanson review for the general reader the theories first advanced in the 1960s by the game theorist Thomas Schelling that self-deception can have a tactical advantage. Those theories were then brought into evolutionary psychology by Robert Trivers, in such books as his The Folly of Fools, 2011. They have also been promoted by Robert Kurzban, in such books as Why Everyone (Else) is a Hypocrite, 2013.

According to Simler and Hanson, the Freudian interpretation of self-deception, as articulated by Anna Freud in her book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, 1992, is that the ego deceives itself to reduce its psychic pain. The ego cannot handle the truth, so it lies for self-preservation. Simler and Hanson point out that this makes no sense from a survival point of view. Lying to yourself in critical situations could only make those situations worse through bad decisions. Natural selection would have evolved brains with more robust self-esteem.

The empirical evidence is that we are likely to deceive ourselves only when it is outward-facing and self-serving. The best way to convince others of something is to genuinely believe it ourselves. "By this line of reasoning, it's never useful ... to adopt false beliefs that you keep entirely to yourself" (Simler, 79). Because the human mind is modular, some of our motives--the deep-seated, selfish ones--can be hidden from the conscious part of the mind. The conscious mind is the part which interacts with other people socially. Simler and Hanson borrow a concept from Daniel Dennett, Jonathan Haidt, and Robert Kurzban that the conscious mind is less like the Commander-in-Chief of the brain and more like the brain's Press Secretary, offering socially acceptable rationalizations for the brain's behavior.

Human societies use norms to control selfish behavior. These norms often deal with our intentions. For example, all cultures have norms encouraging sexual modesty as a way to keep the peace within social groups. If our subconscious mind can hide the selfish motives for our actions (such as flirting with a high-status individual) from our conscious minds, we can convince others that our motives are pure. "In this sense, the Freuds were right: the conscious ego needs to be protected. But not because we are fragile, but rather to keep damaging information from leaking out ..." (Simler, 89). Sexual symbolism in art and literature is not an example of the id trying to get around the superego but an example of individuals being able to violate the social norm against advertising sex while offering plausible deniability.

Self-deception is another point where Freudian psychology clashes with evolutionary psychology. Self-deception offers another way in which ELC (evolutionary literary criticism) can differ from Freudian literary interpretation. The evolutionary explanation has the benefit of more solid evidence in its favor. The evolutionary explanation can explain patterns of behavior the elude the Freudian theory.